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BACKGROUND: Patient experience measures are cen-
tral to many pay-for-performance (P4P) programs na-
tionally, but the effect of performance-based financial
incentives on improving patient care experiences has
not been assessed.
METHODS: The study uses Clinician & Group CAHPS
data from commercially insured adult patients (n=
124,021) who had visits with 1,444 primary care
physicians from 25 California medical groups between
2003 and 2006. Medical directors were interviewed to
assess the magnitude and nature of financial incentives
directed at individual physicians and the patient expe-
rience improvement activities adopted by groups. Mul-
tilevel regression models were used to assess the
relationship between performance change on patient
care experience measures and medical group charac-
teristics, financial incentives, and performance im-
provement activities.
RESULTS: Over the course of the study period, physi-
cians improved performance on the physician-patient
communication (0.62 point annual increase, p<0.001),
care coordination (0.48 point annual increase, p<0.001),
and office staff interaction (0.22 point annual increase,
p=0.02) measures. Physicians with lower baseline per-
formance on patient experience measures experienced
larger improvements (p<0.001). Greater emphasis on
clinical quality and patient experience criteria in individ-
ual physician incentive formulas was associated with
larger improvements on the care coordination (p<0.01)
and office staff interaction (p<0.01) measures. By con-
trast, greater emphasis on productivity and efficiency
criteria was associated with declines in performance on
the physician communication (p<0.01) and office staff
interaction (p<0.001) composites.
CONCLUSIONS: In the context of statewide measure-
ment, reporting, and performance-based financial
incentives, patient care experiences significantly im-
proved. In order to promote patient-centered care in pay
for performance and public reporting programs, the
mechanisms by which program features influence
performance improvement should be clarified.
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reporting; patients’ experiences of care; quality improvement.
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INTRODUCTION
Using financial incentives to induce meaningful and lasting
improvements in health care quality is a strategy that is
gaining rapid and widespread appeal in the United States
1–3.
To date, pay-for-performance programs (P4P) have been
employed in select markets in the US and most extensively
implemented in the UK
4–6. Recent efforts by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to implement P4P in
the Medicare program, however, have catapulted the approach
into high prominence here
7. In the US, the state of California
has the largest and most long-standing experience with pay-
for-performance. The Integrated Health Association’s (IHA)
statewide initiative in California, launched in 2004, addresses
three areas of performance: clinical care processes, patient
care experiences, and office-based information systems.
Through the combined efforts of six insurers, California
medical groups are offered financial incentives for achieving
high performance in these areas. From 2004 through 2008,
the annual incentive payments have ranged from $38–60
million
8. In addition to these financial incentives, medical
group performance is motivated by the annual public reporting
of group-level performance results in two of the three areas:
clinical care processes and patient care experiences. Medical
groups use incentive compensation in diverse ways. For
example, some groups may choose to direct incentive compen-
sation to individual physicians using group-defined financial
incentives, while some groups use incentive compensation for
other organizational priorities
9.
The successes
10–13 and challenges
14–18 of improving clinical
care processes have been well documented following the intro-
duction of public reporting and/or financial incentives related to
this area of measurement, but virtually nothing is known about
thepotentialforpatientcareexperiences tobeimprovedthrough
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1281public reporting or financial incentive programs
19,20. Recent
studies in the UK, however, indicate that pay-for-performance
reduced continuity of patient care
21, changed the dynamic
between doctors and nurses and the nature of the physician-
patient relationship
22. Using longitudinal survey data from
patients of 1,444 primary care physicians (PCPs) belonging to
27 California medical groups during 2004–2007, our study
examines whether the magnitude and nature of medical group
performance-based financial incentives are associated with
improved patients’ experiences of primary care.
METHODS
Patient Sampling and Survey Administration
The study draws on commercially insured patients who had
encounters with 1,444 adult PCPs from 27 medical groups in
California between the years 2003–2006. During each of the
four survey years (2004–2007), a random sample of approxi-
mately 100 patients per physician who had at least one visit
with their PCP during the prior year were mailed a survey. All
commercially insured patients visiting the physicians during
the study year were eligible to receive a survey. Although an
individual patient could respond to the survey in multiple
years, the deidentified patient survey data could not be linked
at the patient level.
The survey included core measures from the Clinician &
Group CAHPS survey
23 and supplemental measures from the
Ambulatory Care Experiences Survey (ACES), a validated
survey that measures patients’ experiences with a specific,
named physician and that physician’s practice
24. Mailings
included an invitation letter, a printed survey, and a postage-
paid return envelope. The survey invitation included a person-
al online code that gave respondents the option of completing
the survey using the web. Previous analysis has demonstrated
the absence of web survey mode effects for the patient survey
questions
25. The survey invitation listed a toll-free number for
patients to obtain surveys in Spanish. A second invitation and
questionnaire were sent to non-respondents 2 weeks after the
initial mailing. Each annual data collection effort spanned a
period of approximately 8 weeks.
Patient Survey Content
For this analysis, we consider four survey composite mea-
sures: physician communication (six items), care coordination
(two items), access to care (five items), and office staff
interaction (two items) (see Appendix). The physician commu-
nication, access to care, and office staff interaction summary
measures represent core item and composite content of the
CAHPS Clinician & Group Survey
23, which was endorsed by
the National Quality Forum (NQF) for use in evaluating
ambulatory care received from individual physicians and their
practices. All survey questions consist of a six-point response
continuum ranging from “never” to “always”. All questions
reference care received from that particular physician and the
physician’s practice over the past 12 months. Composite
measures all achieve physician-level reliability of 0.70 or
higher with samples of approximately 30–40 established
patients per physician
24,26,27.
Patient Survey Composite Scoring
As detailed elsewhere
24, survey questions were scored linearly
from 0 (“never”)t o1 0 0( “always”) points, with higher scores
indicating more favorable performance. Composites were calcu-
lated as the unweighted average of responses to all items
comprising the measure after applying the half-scale rule
28,29,
which includes only respondents who complete at last half of the
questions comprising a composite.Most measures had consistent
item consistent and wording across years. For the access to care
composite, we used an adjusted half-scale approach to calculate
scores
30. This scoring method facilitated the comparison of
composites across time because items were treated in a compa-
rable way across years, and each individual item’sc o n t r i b u t i o nt o
the overall scale was factored into the composite calculation.
Analytic Sample
Of 399,392 outgoing patient surveys over the 4 study years,
14,226(3.6%) were undeliverable because of bad address
information or patient death. Surveys were received from
145,522 respondents, yielding an adjusted response rate of
37.8%. The analytic sample included 135,401 respondents
(average per physician=93.8) who confirmed having seen their
PCP during the prior 12 months. Respondents who did not
confirm the named physician as their PCP or indicated that
they did not visit the physician during the prior 12 months (n=
10,121) were excluded from the analysis. The commericially
insured respondent sample was 35.1% male, 64.9% non-
Hispanic White, 13.1% Hispanic, 12.2% Asian, 3.6% Black,
44.4% reported completing college, and 67.5% reported having
at least one chronic medical condition; 47.1% reported being
established with their PCP for 5 years or longer. Of the 1,444
physicians included in the analytic sample, 427 physicians
participated in the survey initiative all 4 years (2004–2007),
283 physicians participated during 3 of the 4 years, and 734
participated during 2 of the 4 years.
Medical Director Interview
Medical director interviews were conducted via telephone
between April and June 2007. The pool of eligible medical
groups consisted of groups that participated in IHA’s medical
group performance-based financial incentive program and
assessed patient care experiences at the individual physician-
level in 2007. The interview assessed whether PCPs were
eligible to receive performance-based financial incentives and
the maximum possible magnitude of the incentives as a
percentage of base compensation. In addition, directors were
asked about the formulae used to calculate physician incen-
tives, including the percent of the incentive that was based on
productivity (e.g., average patients seen per day), efficiency
(e.g., limiting referrals, effective panel management), patient
experience measures, clinical quality measures, and “other”
criteria (physician seniority, prescribing generic medications,
and other contributions to the medical group). Finally, direc-
tors were asked whether their organization was presently
engaged in various patient experience performance improve-
ment activities, including sharing patients’ experience mea-
sures with physicians in individual feedback sessions,
interpersonal skills training, business practice redesign, and
practice leader compensation. A composite measure reflecting
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adopted by groups was constructed by summing responses to
the individual questions (range: 0–4, α=0.65). Of the 27
medical groups eligible for this study (groups with 2 or more
years of participation in the patient survey initiative), inter-
views were conducted with 25 medical group directors or
designees, resulting in a 92.6% response rate.
Statistical Analyses
Change over time for each patient survey composite was
assessed using two sets of multilevel regression models. First,
models were specified for each patient survey composite that
used physician and medical group random effects to account for
the clustering of patients within physicians and physicians and
medical groups. These unadjusted models included a continu-
ous measure of time (survey year). The second set of multilevel
regression models was specified identically to the unadjusted
models, but also controlled for patient age, gender, race/
ethnicity, education, and self-rated physical health, which are
commonly used to adjust patient experience measures
31,32. For
the physician random effects, the intercept value represents the
first year of participation in the survey initiative for each
physician, and the slope represents the annual performance
change over the physician’s baseline year. The model also
permitted calculation of the correlation between the physician
intercept and slope
33 in order to assess the extent to which
physician performance change over time was associated with
baselineperformance.FollowingElliottet.al.
34,westandardized
the change over time coefficients in terms of physician-level
standard deviations (SDs) for each composite. This allowed us to
describe the average annual change as the change in percentile
pointsitwouldrepresent fora physicianatthe50th percentile at
baseline. We also examined the extent to which alternative
explanations, including panel maturation, varying (and some-
times small) patient samples sizes per physician, and physi-
cians’ years of participation might account for change over time.
These analyses are presented in the online appendix.
Physicians’ baseline CAHPS composite scores were compared
by medical group characteristics, financial incentives, and
patient experience improvement activities. Differences in med-
ical group baseline composite scores by medical group variables
were assessed using multilevel models that accounted for the
clustering of patients within physicians and physicians within
medical groups. Finally, for each survey composite measure, we
assessed the medical group-level predictors of physician perfor-
mance change over time. We chose to introduce each of the
medical group financial incentive and patient experience im-
provement variables independentlybecause the modestnumber
of medical groups involved (n=25) could result in overfitting of
models. Forexample,24degrees offreedom atthemedicalgroup
level could perfectly capture any arbitrary pattern of the medical
groupmeans, evenifthey wereentirelyunrelatedtothespecified
predictors. Each model was specified using physician and
medical group random effects and controlled for medical group
type (staff model vs. IPAvs. hybrid). To account for differences in
the patient case mix across individual physician practices and
years, models also controlled for patient age, gender, race/
ethnicity, education, and self-rated physical health. Each model
included the main effect and time interactions for the medical
group variable under study. Statistically significant medical
group variables were then specified jointly in models. Joint Wald
tests were used to examine the extent to which the set of
interaction terms (change over time predictors) jointly
accounted for a statistically significant amount of the observed
change over time on the composite measure. All continuous
patient and medical group measures were standardized to a
mean of 0 and a variance of 1 for the comparable interpretation
of regression coefficients. All analyses were conducted using the
XTMIXED module in STATA 10.0
33, which uses restricted
maximum likelihood (REML) to estimate random effects.
RESULTS
Performance Change over Time
Table 1 presents unadjusted and adjusted annual change
scores, by composite measure. During the course of the study
period (measurement years 2004–2007), performance on the
physician communication composite increased by 0.74 points
per year [95% confidence interval (CI): 0.61, 0.87, p<0.001],
indicating that physicians who participated in the initiative
during all 4 years improved by an average of 2.22 points (95%
CI:1.83,2.61).Themagnitudeofimprovementdecreasedslightly
in adjusted analyses (annual point change=0.62; 95% CI: 0.49,
0.75, p<0.001). A 0.62 point annual point improvement for a
physicianatthe50thpercentileatbaseline correspondstoa10.8
percentile point increase in percentile rank during the first
follow-up period, i.e., the equivalent of improving to the 61st
percentile of the baseline distribution (Table 1, column 4). There
were also statistically significant adjusted improvements on the
care coordination (0.48; 95% CI: 0.26, 0.69) and office staff
interaction (annual point change=0.22; 95% CI: 0.04, 0.40,
p=0.02) composites. However, in adjusted analyses, perfor-
mance on the access composite (annual point change=0.06;
95% CI: −0.19, 0.32) did not improve over time. The physician
slope-intercept correlation was comparable across composite
measures (between −0.34 and −0.51; Table 1, column 4). Nega-
tive correlations indicate that physicians with lower baseline
performance on composite measures improved more over time
compared to physicians with higher baseline performance.
Medical Group Activities and Baseline
Performance
Physicians’ baseline performance on patient survey composite
scores did not differ by most medical group characteristics or
the number of patient experience improvement activities
adopted (Table 2). Baseline performance differed by medical
groups’ financial incentive formulae and financial incentive
magnitude for the care coordination and office staff interac-
tions composites, although the associations were not consis-
tent across measures.
Medical Group Predictors of Performance Change
Some medical group financial incentive characteristics were
significantly associated with change over time on patient
experience measures when examined independently of other
group-level predictors (Table 3). Greater emphasis on clinical
quality and patient experience criteria in individual physician
incentive formulas was associated with larger improvements
on the care coordination (p<0.01) and office staff interaction (p
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Composite measure Unadjusted annual
score change
Adjusted annual
score change
a
Annual change
in physician percentile
points (adjusted model)
b
Physician slope-intercept
correlation (adjusted model)
Physician
communication
0.74 (0.61, 0.87) ** 0.62 (0.49, 0.75) ** 10.8 −0.38 (−0.47, −0.28) **
Care coordination 0.76 (0.53, 0.98) ** 0.48 (0.26, 0.69) ** 6.7 −0.43 (−0.52, −0.34) **
Access to care 0.32 (0.06, 0.58) * 0.06 (−0.19, 0.32) 1.0 −0.34 (−0.42, −0.26) **
Office staff interactions 0.47 (0.28, 0.66) ** 0.22 (0.04, 0.40) * 3.5 −0.51 (−0.57, −0.44) **
Notes:
Composite measures are scored on a 0–100-point scale. All change over time estimates account for the clustering of patients within physicians and
physicians within medical groups
aAdjusted estimates control for patient age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and self-rated physical health
bChanges in physician percentile points are calculated for the 50th percentile of physician performance at baseline
The physician slope-intercept correlation reflects the extent to which physician performance change is associated with baseline performance. A negative
slope-intercept correlation indicates that physicians with lower baseline performance had larger improvements compared to physicians with higher
baseline performance
*p<0.05, **p<0.001
Table 2. Baseline Medical Group Performance on Patient Experience Measures by Group Characteristics
Group n Patient experience measure
Physician
communication
Care
coordination
Access
to care
Office staff
interactions
Overall 25 87.9 77.3 83.7 83.5
Group size—Number of primary care physicians (PCPs)
≤20 PCPs 5 88.9 78.9 83.3 85.0
21–38 PCPs 6 87.0 76.7 81.4 82.1
39–86 PCPs 6 87.3 77.6 83.2 84.0
≥87 PCPs (reference) 8 88.1 77.2 84.2 83.4
Medical group type
Independent practice association (reference) 13 87.1 77.8 85.3 84.2
Integrated medical group 10 88.5 77.4 82.8 82.9
Hybrid group 2 89.2 77.5 80.1 81.5
Financial incentive magnitude
Primary care physicians not eligible 4 86.1 74.5 82.3 83.6
≤10% of base compensation 16 88.4 78.3* 82.8 82.9
>10% of base compensation (reference) 5 87.2 75.7 85.9 84.4
Financial incentive payment formulae
Productivity and efficiency
None 11 88.1 76.9 81.7 82.1
1–30% of weight 3 88.5 80.5 85.7 84.9
31% or more weight (reference) 7 87.4 76.3 85.3 84.2
Patient experience
None 1 87.5 76.9 84.7 86.2**
1–30% of weight 15 87.8 77.7 85.1 84.4
31% or more weight (reference) 5 88.2 76.8 81.2 81.4
Clinical quality
None 1 87.5 76.9 84.7 86.2**
1–30% of weight 12 87.9 78.0 85.8 84.6
31% or more weight (reference) 8 87.9 76.5 81.0 81.5
Other criteria
None 7 87.7 75.4* 80.5 82.4
1–30% of weight 9 87.7 77.0 85.0 83.6
31% or more weight (reference) 5 88.7 80.5 85.4 85.0
Patient experience improvement activities (count)
a
None 6 86.9 77.9 84.4 83.3
Two 8 88.5 79.0 83.4 83.2
Three 7 87.6 76.5 81.9 83.0
Four (reference) 4 87.8 76.3 85.0 83.9
Notes: Patient experience measures are scored on a scale of 0–100, with higher values indicating better performance; *p<0.05, **p<0.01 compared to
reference group. Results account for the clustering of patients within physicians and physicians within medical groups using random effects.
aNone of the medical directors reported adopting only one patient experience improvement activity
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ity and efficiency criteria was associated with worse perfor-
mance over time on the physician communication (p<0.01)
and office staff interaction (p<0.001) measures. Contrary to
our expectations, physicians belonging to groups that used
smaller (≤10% of base compensation) incentives improved
more over time on the communication (p<0.01) and office staff
interaction (p<0.001) measures compared to physicians be-
longing to groups that used larger (>10% of base compensa-
tion) incentives. This counterintuitive result likely stems from
the fact that the groups with larger incentives used heavy
productivity and efficiency criteria in their formulae (data not
shown). The number of patient experience improvement
activities undertaken by medical groups was not associated
with performance change over time.
When significant medical group predictors of change over
time were jointly tested in models that included one another,
most joint tests indicated that the combinations remained
statistically significant. This suggests that one or more of the
variables included in the joint test explain change over time on
the patient experience composite, but multilevel models that
account for both interaction terms lack the statistical power to
distinguish between them. For example, the magnitude and
formulae of individual physician financial incentives were
independently associated with improvements on the physician
communication composite, but not in models that included
one another. Tests examining the joint significance of financial
incentive magnitude and formulae (χ
2=11.59, p<0.05) suggest
a substantial amount of shared association with improve-
ments in physician communication.
DISCUSSION
This study assessing the relationship of medical group perfor-
mance-based financial incentives and individual physician
performance improvement on patient care experience mea-
sures has several important findings relevant to the design and
implementation of pay-for-performance programs. First, per-
formance on the physician communication, care coordination,
and office staff interactions composite measures have signifi-
cantly improved since the inception of California’s pay-for-
performance program in 2004. The magnitude of annual
improvement on the physician communication and care
coordination composites is associated with a 10.8 and 6.7
annual percentile point increase, respectively, for a physician
Table 3. Medical Group Characteristics and Performance Change over Time on Patient Experience Measures
Patient experience measure
Physician communication Care coordination Access to care Office staff interactions
Medical group predictors of change over time (time interactions)
a
Financial incentive magnitude
>10% of base compensation (reference) −− − −
≤10% of base compensation 0.36** −0.83 0.24 0.74***
PCPs not eligible for incentives −0.37 0.36 0.10 −0.24
Financial incentive payment formulae
Patients’ experiences (%) 0.01 0.03** 0.00 0.03***
Productivity and efficiency (%) −0.19** −0.23 0.01 −0.34***
Clinical quality (%) 0.20** 0.27* 0.08 0.30**
Patient experience improvement activities
Improvement activities count −0.11 0.04 −0.07 −0.18
Change over time joint tests
b
Productivity and efficiency weight in formula 9.26 (2)**
Clinical quality weight in formula
Patient experiences weight in formula 8.93 (2)*
Clinical quality weight in formula
Productivity and efficiency weight in formula 17.56 (2)***
Patient experiences weight in formula
Productivity and efficiency weight in formula 11.59 (4)*
Clinical quality weight in formula
Financial incentive magnitude (two terms)
Productivity and efficiency weight in formula 20.28 (4)***
Patient experiences weight in formula
Financial incentive magnitude (two terms)
Notes:
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Change over time predictors were examined individually in models that controlled for patient age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and self-rated
physical health, medical group type, the main effect of the change over time variable, and accounted for the clustering of patients within physicians and
physicians within medical group using random effects
aPatient experience measures are scored on a scale of 0–100, with higher values indicating better performance. Coefficients represent the effect of the
characteristic or activity on change on the composite score. Continuous measures, e.g., financial incentive payment formulae, are standardized to have a
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, so the coefficients represent the effect of a standard deviation change for the variable on performance change
Joint tests examine to the extent to which the interaction terms (change over time predictors) jointly account for a statistically significant amount of the
observed change over time on the composite measure
bThe χ
2 statistics and number of variables tested in the joint Wald tests are presented, along with statistical significance
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consider a 5–10 point improvement in a physician’s percentile
rank over one year as a practically meaningful change.
Moreover, previous research assessing the effect of communi-
cation interventions on improvements on patients’ experiences
measures
35 suggests that the observed changes in physician
communication are clinically meaningful. Our findings under-
score that even with fairly tight performance distributions
commonly found for patient satisfaction and experience mea-
sures
36, significant improvement is possible.
The improvement is also noteworthy because previous anal-
yses have found substantial declines in physician-patient
relationship quality over time. For example, in the late 1990s,
before the Institute of Medicine called attention to the impor-
tance of patient-centered care
37, there were no statewide or
other large-scale efforts to measure patient care experiences. At
this time, primary care performance reporting and incentives
focused entirely on clinical quality measures, and substantial
improvement was observed
38–40. Patients’ experiences of prima-
ry care, however, deteriorated in both commercially insured
adult and Medicare-insured elderly patient populations
41,42.
The improvements in primary care patients’ experiences ob-
served in this study are a marked contrast to those earlier
trends, and may be owed, in part, to the heightened salience of
patient-centered care nationally during that period and the
specific measurement and accountability activities related to
patient care experiences in California. Our results were fairly
robust to many sensitivity tests assessing alternative explana-
tions, including small patient sample sizes for some physicians,
physicians with fewer years of participation, and panel matura-
tion.Future researchshouldclarifytheextent towhichobserved
improvements stem from secular trends, performance-based
financial incentives and other improvement activities.
Consistent with evidence assessing the effects of pay-for-
performance programs on the technical quality of care
11, our
slope-intercept correlation results indicate that physicians with
lower baseline patient survey scores were more likely to improve
performance compared to physicians with higher scores at
baseline even with random effects controlling for regression to
the mean. This suggests that targeting patient experience
improvement activities at individual physician practices with
lower baseline performance may result in the most cost-effective
use of resources. Medical groups and health plans, however,
might want to foster a quality culture by making improvement
activities broadly available to all physician practices. For
example, including high performing practices in improvement
activities may facilitate organizational learning
43.
Finally, we found that the criteria used in individual
physicians’ financial incentive formula were associated with
changes over time on most composite measures. Specifically,
greater emphases on clinical quality and patient experience
performance and fewer emphases on productivity and efficiency
criteria were associated with larger improvements. Our results
are consistent with evidence that strong use of productivity
incentives may result in unintended consequences, including
physician
44 and patient
45 dissatisfaction. Productivity incen-
tives might not effectively cultivate the working relationships of
physicians, advanced practice clinicians, and office staff
46, and
a weak relationship emphasis may spill over to patient care. In
addition to clarifying the precise mechanisms by which medical
group financial incentive characteristics affect performance on
patient experience measures, other organizational influences,
including group culture
47,s h o u l db ee x a m i n e di nl a r g e r
samples of medical groups.
Our findings should be considered in light of important
limitations. First, while detailed information about the magni-
tude and nature of financial incentives directed at individual
physicians was analyzed, we could not account for secular
trends in performance improvement analytically because a
control group was not available. However, the study is the first
to find large-scale improvements in patients’ experiences of
primary care over time, suggesting that the public reporting
and/or financial incentive program may have induced im-
provement. Second, response rates across years were modest,
and information about non-respondents was not available. As
a result, it is not possible to assess the extent to which
differential patient non-response by physician may affect the
reliable measurement of physician performance. Previous
analyses indicate that the nature of non-response on the
patient survey measures does not differ significantly across
physicians and that differences in the extent of non-response
across physicians are too small to meaningfully affect overall
results
24. Consequently, non-response seems unlikely to threat-
en the integrity of the physician-level analyses presented. Third,
although the study’s physician sample is large, our results might
not generalize to other states with different demographic dis-
tributions or market conditions. However, the medical groups
studied are a mix of integrated, salaried practices and indepen-
dent practice associations and are likely representative of groups
that are actively engaged in performance improvement. Finally,
we did not assess physician influences on performance change
over time. Individual physicians account for the largest propor-
tion of explainable variation on ambulatory care experience
measures
24,48, so physician factors are likely to explain perfor-
mance change on patient experience measures. For example,
data on physician characteristics and attitudes concerning
public reporting and pay-for-performance implementation
49
might explain performance improvement.
In conclusion, our study, the first to assess the relationship
between the use of performance-based financial incentives and
changes in patients’ experiences over time in the US
21,
suggests public reporting and pay-for-performance can poten-
tially improve physician communication, access to care, and
office staff interactions as experienced and reported by
patients. In the context of statewide measurement, reporting,
and performance-based financial incentives, patient care
experiences significantly improved. The study is the first to
document large-scale improvements in patient care experi-
ences over time
41,42. The magnitude and nature of financial
incentives directed at individual physicians explained a signif-
icant proportion of the observed improvements, indicating that
the incentives used by groups or unmeasured characteristics
of medical groups associated with the use of incentives, e.g.,
group culture, account for changes in physician performance
on patient experience measures over time. In order to promote
patient-centered care in pay-for-performance and public
reporting programs, the mechanisms by which program
features affect performance improvement should be clarified.
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APPENDIX
Table 4. Patient Survey Composite Measures
Composite measure Item content
Physician
communication
(α=0.93)
In the last 12 months…
…how often did this doctor explain things in a way that was easy to understand?
…how often did this doctor listen carefully to you?
…how often did this doctor give you easy-to-understand instructions about what to do to take care of the heath problems or
concerns that were bothering you?
…how often did this doctor seem to know the important information about your medical history?
1
…how often did this doctor spend enough time with you?
…how often did this doctor show respect for what you had to say?
Care coordination
(α=0.61)
In the last 12 months…
…how often did this doctor seem informed and up-to-date about the care you got from specialist doctors?
…when this doctor sent you for a blood test, x-ray, or other test, how often did someone from the doctor's office follow up to give
you the test results?
Access to care
(α=0.85)
In the last 12 months…
…when you called this doctor’s office to get an appointment for care you needed right away, how often did you get an
appointment as soon as you thought you needed it?
…when you made an appointment for a check-up or routine care with this doctor, how often did you get an appointment as soon
as you thought you needed it?
…when you called this doctor's office with a medical question during regular office hours, how often did you get an answer to
your question that same day?
…when you called this doctor's office after regular office hours, how often did you get the medical help or advice you needed?
Wait time includes times spent in the waiting room and exam room. In the last 12 months, how often did your visits at this
doctor's office start within 15 min of your appointment?
Office staff
interactions
(α=0.89)
In the last 12 months…
…how often were clerks and receptionists at this doctor's office as helpful as you thought they should be?
…how often did clerks and receptionists at this doctor's office treat you with courtesy and respect?
Notes: Response scales and scoring for all questions: never (0 points), almost never (20 points), sometimes (40 points), usually (60 points), almost always
(80 points), always (100 points
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